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COURTS-SCOPE OF AUTHORITY-STERILIZATION OF MENTAL DEFECTIVES-

Respondent, age nineteen, appeared before the probate court of Muskingum
County, Ohio, upon an affidavit1 filed by her mother alleging the child
to be feeble-minded and in need of medical treatment.2 Results of psychological tests were presented at the hearing, revealing that respondent had an
intelligence quotient of thirty-six and was therefore a feeble-minded person
within the statutory definition. 3 Respondent had had one illegitimate child,
for whom she was unable to provide even rudimentary care or financial
support, and was physically capable of bearing more children. Taking judicial notice that the state mental hospitals were then overcrowded and unable to accommodate additional inmates, the probate court invoked its
interim power to provide for the welfare of incompetents until they can
be committed to an institution.• On order from the probate court, held,
respondent will submit to a salpingectomy5 operation in an approved hos-

1 OHIO REv. CODE .ANN. § 5122.11 (Page Supp. 1962).
2 See Newman, Sterili:ation: Pro and Con, Detroit Free Press, July 4, 1962, p. 7,
col. 1.
s OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5125.24 (Page Supp. 1962).
4 OHIO REv. CODE ANN, § 5125.!l0 (Page Supp. 1962), which provides: "If by reason
of inability of the hospitals for the feeble-minded to receive additional patients and if
[state authorities are] • • • unable to provide for the custody and care of any feebleminded person, the head of the hospital to which application is made shall forthwith
notify the judge of the probate court in which the proceedings ••• are pending . . . •
The probate judge shall then take such action and make such order as he deems necessary
and advisable to provide for the detention, supervision, care, and maintenance of said
feeble-minded person • • • until such time as he may be received in a hospital for the
feeble-minded."
II Salpingectomy is the medical term for cutting the Fallopian tubes to effect female
sterilization.
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pital by a licensed physician. The legislative grant of plenary power at law
and in equity,6 as well as the special interim authority to care for incompetents, enable the probate court to provide extraordinary relief which
takes into consideration the interests of both the incompetent and the
community. In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
The constitutionality of sterilization laws7 is no longer a debatable issue
so long as procedural safeguards such as notice, hearing, and judicial review
are provided for and observed. 8 However, the significant feature of the
principal case is that the state of Ohio has no such legislation. Thus, the
court was forced to sustain its action on the basis of the statutory language providing probate courts with interim supervisory power when the
mental hospitals are overcrowded, and also on its general equity power.
In considering the validity of the latter basis, it is necessary to examine
the early pattern of control over incompetent persons. Originally in England, the lord of the manor was entitled to the wardship of the land and
person of those of unsound mind. However, because of frequent abuses of
this power, control of idiots and lunatics become reposed in the crown,
to the exclusion of the feudal lords.9 The King, as parens patriae, was intrusted with the care and custody of his insane subjects, but to avoid the
burden of direct administration he delegated the duty to the chancellor,
as keeper of the King's conscience.10 Thus, the lunatic became a ward of
chancery by special royal commission and did not come within its
6 Omo R.Ev. CoDE ANN. § 2101.24 (Page Supp. 1962), which provides: "Except as
otherwise provided by law, the probate court has jurisdiction: .•• (F) To make inquests respecting lunatics, insane persons, idiots. . . . The probate court shall have
plenary power at law and in equity to fully dispose of any matter properly before the
court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by statute."
7 Early attempts at state-authorized sterilization bowed to a host of constitutional
objections. An Indiana statute which allowed a board of examiners full discretion,
within prescribed procedures, to determine if sterilization should be performed was
held to be a violation of procedural due process because it failed to provide an avenue
for judicial review. Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921). See also Davis
v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914). In Osborn v. Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169
, N.Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918), statutory delegation of judicial power to a board whose
duty was to determine if sterilization should be performed was declared to be contrary
to the doctrine of separation of powers. Statutes providing for sterilization of criminals,
epileptics and the feeble-minded confined in public institutions, but not providing the
same for those kept elsewhere, were deemed arbitrary class legislation which denied equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Haynes v. Williams, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Board of
Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 Atl. 963 (1913). But see Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409,
204 N.W. 140 (1925) (incompetent persons not an unreasonable classification denying
equal protection); In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P .2d 153 (1933) (incompetent's right to
procreativity subordinate to police power to legislate for general welfare).
s E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac.
668 (1931); State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604 (1928); see Comment,
26 N.D.B. BRIEFS 183, 184 (1950).
9 11 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, Insanity § 3, at 114 n.3 (1890);
l HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (6th ed. 1938); MEGARRY & BAKER, SNELL'S
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 493 (1954).
10 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 427 (Wendell ed. 1854).
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general equity jurisdiction.11 A landmark decision long ago put to rest
any doubts as to the status of equity's power over incompetents. 12 Indeed,
the chancery court was unable even to appoint a guardian of the lunatic's
person. 13 Therefore, reliance on the traditional powers of equity in ordering sterilization of an incompetent is based on the erroneous assumption
that courts of equity historically had jurisdiction of such persons. 14
The other alleged source of authority for the court's action in the principal case is a statutory provision directing that the probate court shall
intercede to provide for the "detention, supervision, care, and maintenance"
of incompetents until admission to an institution is obtainable. 111 Whether
this legislation was intended to encompass sterilization orders is certainly
debatable. Less than four months prior to this decision the Ohio legislature
made substantial revisions in its mental health laws relating to the substantive rights of incompetent persons in commitment proceedings. 16 It is
certainly arguable that, if the legislature had intended to follow those states
authorizing eugenic sterilization,17 it could easily have enacted appropriate
legislation in the course of this statutory revision. Even a broad construction of the words "detention, supervision, care, and maintenance" does not
seem to suggest that sterilization would fit compatibly within their scope.
It is conceded that the notion of "care" encompasses providing for both
physical and mental welfare. If a ward of the court required an appendectomy or dental attention, for example, treatment could obviously be
authorized. 18 Likewise, if the incompetent's home environment caused
frustration and anxiety, it would be appropriate remedial relief to place
11 "The administration of idiots and lunatics' estates is, in virtue of a personal
authority, committed by the crown, not the court of chancery, but to a certain great
officer of the crown, not of necessity the person who has the custody of the great seal,
though it generally attends him, by a warrant from the crown, which confers no
jurisdiction, but only a power of administration." 2 MADDOCK, THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 565-66 (1817).
12 Beall v. Smith, L.R. 9 Ch. 85 (1873), where the court stated: "It is to be borne
in -mind that unsoundness of mind gives the Court of Chancery no jurisdiction whatsoever. The Court of Chancery is not the curator either of the person or the estate
of a person non compos mentis whom it does not and can not make its ward." Id. at 92.
13 In re Bligh, 12 Ch. D. 364 (1879); In re Brandon's Trusts, 13 Ch. D. 773 (1879).
14 In England today jurisdiction over incompetents is exercised by the Chancellor
and the Lord Justices in Chancery. However, this result has been accomplished by
modern statutory enactments. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 476.
111 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5125.30 (Page Supp. 1962).
16 See generally Haines &: Myers, Hospitalization and Treatment of the Mentally Ill:
Ohio's New Mental Health Law, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 659 (1961); Tuma, Civil Rights of the
Mentally Ill in Ohio, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 306 (1962).
17 Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, ·west Virginia, Wisconsin. Four other states' sterilization laws have been declared
unconstitutional and have not as yet been re-enacted in conformity with constitutional
standards: Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 'Washington. See O'Hara &: Sanks, Eugenic
Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20, 33 n.80 (1956).
18 For cases where courts have ordered treatment for children over parental objection,
see People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952) (blood transfu-
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him in a foster home. Assuming that the stigma of bearing illegitimate
children would cause an incompetent to suffer mental frustration and
trauma, the question remains whether the probate judge's order in the
principal case was a reasonable exercise of the authority conferred by the
legislature. Important is the fact that the probate court is given only interim
authority in the limited situation where overcrowded conditions do not
permit immediate hospital confinement. Sterilization is a drastic measure
imposing permanent incapacity and is hardly warranted in a situation
that is but the temporary concern of the court. This is especially true
when reasonable alternatives such as closer parental supervision, juvenile
probation, or private psychiatric care could be implemented while commitment proceedings are pending.
The court indicated that the salpingectomy operation would be not
only for the respondent's health and welfare but also "for the benefit of
society as a whole." 19 The argument is frequently advanced that mental
defects may be hereditary and thus increase the burden on society of caring
for incompetents. However, it is by no means settled that defective parents
are likely to procreate insane or incompetent children.20 Indeed, the field
of genetics is so perplexed in its assertions as to the heritability of mental
deficiencies that some professionals claim the scientific basis to be a myth.21
If it is properly within judicial discretion to order eugenic sterilization
simply to obviate a tax burden of providing support for the incompetent's
potential issue, what is to preclude a judge from directing the same treatment for those who must depend on public welfare assistance? And if such
measures are proper in view of the societal economic interest, the basic
principle might be extended to authorize abortions for women who are
incompetent or indigent. The potential abuses associated with arbitrary
judicial discretion in these matters are particularly magnified when the
object of that discretion suffers from a mental handicap. Others of sounder
mentality have the ability- to guard their rights and dignity. But the incompetent and feeble-minded must depend largely on others for their
protection. In the principal case the court even failed to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the respondent's interests.22 In the field of criminal
sion); In re Vasco, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933) (removal of malignant
eye); In the Matter of Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941);
In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950) (psychiatric treatment for
delinquent).
19 Principal case at 208.
20 JENNINGS, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE 13 (1930) (stating that two
feeble-minded parents may well have normal children).
21 See DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 372 (1937); Cook, Eugenics or
Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REv. 287, 295-98 (1943); Landman, The History of Human Sterilization in the United States-Theory, Statute, Adjudication, 23 ILL. L. REV. 463 (1929);
Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 YALE L.J. 618
(1943). But see GOSNEY &: POPENOE, STERILIZATION FOR Hu;,.IAN BETTERMENT (1938).
22 OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2111.23 (Page 1954), which provides: "In a suit or proceeding in which the guardian has an adverse interest, the court shall appoint a guardian
ad !item to represent such minor or other person under legal disability."
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law, there is substantial authority for the proposition that failure of a
state court to appoint counsel for a youthful or incompetent defendant is
a deprivation of rights essential to a fair hearing.28 Surely an incompetent
is entitled to due process of law whether a court is administering civil or
criminal justice. Indeed, in juvenile court proceedings, which are closely
analogous because of the absence of criminal sanctions, the right of the
minor to be represented by counsel is recognized.24 At least one federal
court of appeals has squarely held that in commitment proceedings due
process requires that the incompetent be represented by counsel, and the
failure of the court to make such an appointment is reversible error. 25
To sustain such extensive discretion as was asserted by the court in the
principal case is not only dangerous as a precedent but it would render
any notion of inherent limits on a judge's power illusory. Interpreting and
applying the law is a proper judicial function, but the responsibility for
lawmaking rests basically with the legislature.26 Certainly statutory interpretation is not confined to the most strict and literal construction of the
language possible. Such an approach would seriously impair effective
government and impose an onerous burden on the legislature. Because
statutes operate prospectively they must to some degree speak in general
terms. It is the judge's function to apply the legislative policy to the myriad
of factual situations that arise in litigation. If courts had to find an express
legislative mandate for every case, adjudication would virtually come to a
standstill. Indeed, settling disputes in court would become unnecessary because the legislature would make the rule for each circumstance. Even if
28 See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954);
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
The cases where failure to appoint counsel was held not to be a violation of due
process under the "special circumstances" test are readily distinguishable from the prin•
cipal case because the inability of the youthful and mentally retarded girl to represent
herself before the court is undeniable.
24 In McDaniel v. Shea, 278 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1960), a case in a juvenile court which
involved commitment of a minor to an institution, the court said: "We think the
appellant needed a lawyer. Her status was, to say the least, in doubt, and she was
in jeopardy. 'With her liberty in the balance, the assistance of counsel might well have
furthered the best interests both of the child and of the authorities responsible in this
delicate area of social welfare." Id. at 462. See also Shioutakon v. District of Columbia,
236 F.2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2r; Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Howard v. Overholser, 130
F.2d 429, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
20 Whether t11e court in applying the law to a specific factual situation is creating
law or merely interpreting it remains a topic of dispute. For a treatment of the historical
interpretative view, see 1 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 69; CARDozo, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124-25, 136-37 (1922); CARTER, LAw: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND
FUNCTION 235 (190i); HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 67 (4th ed. 1739). For writers
supporting the creative view, see AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 224 (4th ed. 1873);
BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 190 (Everett ed. 1928); GRAY, NATURE AND
SOURCES OF LAw 84, 95, 170-72 (1909). While the basis of dispute is largely rhetorical, the
predominant understanding today is that the judge does engage in the lawmaking process.
The source of difficulty really goes to the scope and extent of such power. BODENHEIMER,
JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1962).
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the enormous task of constantly revising the law was administratively feasible, the rule would often result only after the harm had been done. Thus,
the judicial function necessarily involves substantial discretion, but a
corollary to this is that the courts must act responsibly so as not to abuse
the power entrusted to them. Surely cases may arise where the social interest dictates that the judge "strike a path along new courses.''27 However,
the invisible restraints of precedent and custom "hedge and circumscribe
his action.''28 He is not possessed with broad, far-reaching power to initiate
new policies or to design a legal order to his liking. In the tradition of the
democratic process the making of major revisions of law roust be left to
those entrusted with the task of legislating.29 Principles such as these have
direct relevance to the circumstances of the principal case. No court of
record30 has ever asserted power to order the sterilization of incompetent
persons in the absence of express legislative authorization. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to avoid the conclusion that this court has simply conjured up a novel power without historical or statutory basis.

William R. Warnock

27 CAru>ozo, op. cit. supra note 26, at 112-14.
28 Ibid.
29 See BonENHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 26,

at 380-86.
ao The opinion in the principal case does allude to an unpublished Maryland circuit
court memorandum stating that a sterilization decree "could be made under the general
equity powers of the court." Principal case at 208.

